

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN  
NORTHERN DIVISION

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JAMES MARQUIS SPENCER,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:18-cv-133

v.

Honorable Gordon J. Quist

STATE OF MICHIGAN et al.,

Defendants.

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**OPINION**

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's *pro se* complaint indulgently, *see Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.

**Discussion**

**I. Factual allegations**

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Alger Correctional Facility (LMF) in Munising, Alger County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, relate to a criminal prosecution against Plaintiff which

occurred in Kent County, Michigan, in 2010. Plaintiff sues the State of Michigan, Kent County Prosecutor Helen Brinkman, Police Detective Daniel Adams, Kent County Clerk Mary Hollinrake, Deputy County Clerk Cheryl Wilson, Chief Deputy Court Clerk Hilary Curtis Arthur, and Judge Jeanine N. LaVille.

In his complaint and supplemental pleading (ECF Nos. 1 and 9), Plaintiff alleges Defendants are responsible for knowingly placing false information in his court record which indicates that Plaintiff is a habitual offender. Plaintiff states that the habitual offender charge was dismissed at his preliminary hearing on November 17, 2010. However, Plaintiff claims that the false information remains in his court file in violation of his constitutional rights.

Plaintiff also claims that there is no record of a probable cause hearing and no affidavits to support the warrant. Therefore, Plaintiff asserts that his arrest by Defendant Adams on October 23, 2010, was done without a valid warrant. Plaintiff states that during trial on December 6, 2011, witness Aubrey Wilson admitted that she had lied to police and during the preliminary hearing about her plans for the evening on the night of the alleged crime. Plaintiff also states that Defendant Adams lied in the police report. Plaintiff seeks to have the false information expunged from his record. Plaintiff also seeks monetary damages.

## **II. Failure to state a claim**

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555; *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also *Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the *Twombly/Iqbal* plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); *Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.*, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. *Albright v. Oliver*, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the State of Michigan. Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See

*Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman*, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); *Alabama v. Pugh*, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); *O'Hara v. Wigginton*, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1993). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, *Quern v. Jordan*, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. *Abick v. Michigan*, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In addition, the State of Michigan is not a “person” who may be sued under §1983 for money damages. See *Lapides v. Bd. of Regents*, 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (citing *Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)). Therefore, the Court dismisses the State of Michigan.

Although Plaintiff has not sought leave to amend his complaint to add any defendants, his supplemental pleading asserts that trial witness Aubrey Wilson violated Plaintiff's rights by lying under oath. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); *Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs.*, 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009); *Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.*, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). In order for a private party's conduct to be under color of state law, it must be “fairly attributable to the State.” *Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.*, 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); *Street*, 102 F.3d at 814. There must be “a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of [the defendant] so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” *Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc.*, 963 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing *Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co.*, 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). Plaintiff has not made any allegation by which Aubrey Wilson's conduct could be fairly attributed to the State. Accordingly, he fails to state a § 1983 claim against Aubrey Wilson.

Plaintiff asserts that he has a constitutional right not to have false information in his prison file. The mere retention of inaccurate information in a prisoner's file does not amount to a constitutional violation. *Carson v. Little*, No. 88-1505, 1989 WL 40171 (6th Cir. April 18, 1989) (citing *Pruett v. Levi*, 622 F.2d 256, 258 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)). However, an inmate has a limited right to have erroneous information expunged from his prison file. A prisoner must allege that the information is actually in his file, that it is false, and that the information is relied on to a constitutionally significant degree. *Perotti v. Marshall*, No. 85-3776, 1986 WL 16695, at \*1 (6th Cir. March 14, 1986) (citing *Paine v. Baker*, 595 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1979); *U.S. ex rel Silverman v. Pennsylvania*, 527 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Pa. 1981), *aff'd*, 707 F.2d 1395 (3rd Cir. 1983); and *Pruett*, 622 F.2d at 258). It is not necessary that an inmate wait until an adverse decision has actually been rendered, so long as he alleges that the false information is such that prison officials are likely to rely on it. *Paine*, 595 F.2d at 201; *U.S. ex rel Silverman*, 527 F. Supp. at 745. In this case, Plaintiff states that the false habitual offender charge was dismissed in 2010. Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing that the false information is likely to be used as the basis for an adverse decision against Plaintiff. Moreover, because a prisoner does not have a federal right to parole, the reliance on false information in a prisoner file to deny parole would not be constitutionally significant. *Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates*, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); *see also Board of Pardons v. Allen*, 482 U.S. 369, 373, 107 S. Ct. 2415, 2418 (1987) (the presence of a parole system by itself does not give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole release). Therefore, Plaintiff's claim that he is entitled to expungement of the false information from his prison file is without merit. *Johnson v. Rodriguez*, 110 F.3d 299, 308 n.13 (5th Cir. 1997).

Moreover, the alleged conduct of Defendants in placing false information in his court record occurred in 2010. State statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to

determine the timeliness of claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *Wilson v. Garcia*, 471 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1985). For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. *See* Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10); *Carroll v. Wilkerson*, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); *Stafford v. Vaughn*, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at \*1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). Accrual of the claim for relief, however, is a question of federal law. *Collyer v. Darling*, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996); *Sevier v. Turner*, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984). The statute of limitations begins to run when the aggrieved party knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his action. *Collyer*, 98 F.3d at 220.<sup>1</sup>

Plaintiff's claims are untimely. Plaintiff asserts that the false habitual offender charge was placed in his court record in 2010, and that it was dismissed by judge at the preliminary hearing on November 17, 2010. Therefore, Plaintiff had reason to know of the "harms" done to him at the time they occurred. Hence, his claims accrued in 2010. However, Plaintiff did not file his complaint until August 6, 2018, well past Michigan's three-year limit. Moreover, Michigan law no longer tolls the running of the statute of limitations when a plaintiff is incarcerated. *See* Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5851(9). Further, it is well established that ignorance of the law does not warrant equitable tolling of a statute of limitations. *See Rose v. Dole*, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1991); *Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp.*, 939 F.2d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 1991); *Mason v. Dep't of Justice*, No. 01-5701, 2002 WL 1334756, at \*2 (6th Cir. June 17, 2002).

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<sup>1</sup>28 U.S.C. § 1658 created a "catch-all" limitations period of four years for civil actions arising under federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990. The Supreme Court's decision in *Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.*, 541 U.S. 369 (2004), which applied this federal four-year limitations period to a suit alleging racial discrimination under § 1981 does not apply to prisoner claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 because, while § 1983 was amended in 1996, prisoner civil rights actions under § 1983 were not "made possible" by the amended statute. *Id.* at 382.

A complaint “is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous if it is time-barred by the appropriate statute of limitations. *See Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am.*, 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001). The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that when a meritorious affirmative defense based upon the applicable statute of limitations is obvious from the face of the complaint, *sua sponte* dismissal of the complaint is appropriate. *See Dellis*, 257 F.3d at 511; *Beach v. Ohio*, No. 03-3187, 2003 WL 22416912, at \*1 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 2003); *Castillo v. Grogan*, No. 02-5294, 2002 WL 31780936, at \*1 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 2002); *Duff v. Yount*, No. 02-5250, 2002 WL 31388756, at \*1-2 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 2002); *Paige v. Pandya*, No. 00-1325, 2000 WL 1828653 (6th Cir. Dec. 5, 2000). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s action must be dismissed as frivolous.

### **Conclusion**

Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). *See McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the \$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), *see McGore*, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding *in forma pauperis*, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the \$505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.

This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: November 30, 2018

/s/ Gordon J. Quist  
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GORDON J. QUIST  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE